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DRAFT 1/28/18
THE ELEPHANT ALWAYS FORGETS:
US TAX REFORM AND THE WTO
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah 1 and Martin G. Vallespinos2

ABSTRACT
The “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” (TCJA) enacted on December 22, 2017 includes several
provisions that raise WTO compliance issues. At least one such provision, the ForeignDerived Intangible Income (FDII) rule, is almost certain to draw a challenge in the WTO
and is likely to lead to another US loss and resulting sanctions. This outcome would be
another addition to the repeated losses suffered by the US for export subsidies from the
1970s to 2004, which led to the imposition of sanctions and the ultimate repeal of the
offending regime. The important question for 2018 and beyond is whether the Trump
administration and its Congressional allies will react to such a loss in a similar fashion as
the Bush administration did in 2004, or whether it will defy the WTO, with potential farreaching consequences for the world trade order.
1. Introduction: Tax and Trade
Since the origins of the world trade regime, it has been clear that tax laws can undermine
the proper functioning of trade rules in two main ways. First, taxes can serve as tariff
barriers if they are imposed on imports but not on domestic sales. Second, remission of
taxes on exports can serve as an export subsidy. 3
The first type of tax measure violates GATT II:1(b) because it is an unscheduled charge
on importation that is not an “ordinary customs duty.” Alternatively, if the tax is
imposed on importers but not on domestic sellers, it may violate GATT III:2 as a
discriminatory internal tax.
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The second type of tax measure violates the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Agreement (“SCM Agreement”), which applies to goods but not to services. Article 1 of
the SCM Agreement defines a subsidy as a financial contribution by a government
conferring a benefit, which includes: the direct transfers of funds, goods, or services
(other than infrastructure), and the non-collection or forgiveness of taxes otherwise due.
The SCM Agreement distinguishes three categories of subsidies: prohibited subsidies,
non-actionable subsidies, and actionable subsidies. The prohibited subsidies category,
described in Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, includes:
a. Subsidies that are contingent, in law or in fact, upon export performance, and
b. Subsidies that are contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods.
These subsidies are prohibited outright and countries are allowed to unilaterally impose
countervailing measures against the country that created them.
Annex I of the SCM agreement provides an illustrative list of the prohibited export
subsidies, but also provides two exceptions. One exception is for indirect tax exemptions,
remissions or deferral of prior-stage cumulative taxes levied on inputs that are consumed
in the production of the exported product.4 The second exception is for exemptions,
remissions, or deferrals that are intended to avoid double taxation of foreign-source
income.5
On the other side of the spectrum, the actionable subsidies category includes any other
subsidies that are not considered “prohibited” and that satisfy the following two
additional requirements:
a. Specificity: An actionable subsidy is considered specific when the eligibility to receive
the benefits is limited to certain enterprises, industries, or areas (article 2 of the SCM
Agreement), and;
b. Adverse effect: An actionable subsidy is considered adverse when it produces a serious
prejudice to the interests of another member, an injury to its domestic industry, or a
nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other members
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 (article 5 of the SCM
Agreement).
When an actionable subsidy is specific and produces an adverse effect, the affected
countries are entitled to file a formal complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,
and may impose retaliatory sanctions in the event that the complaint is upheld.

4

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I, paragraphs H and I.
5
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For the first five years after its entry into force, the SCM Agreement contained a third
category of subsidies: The non-actionable subsidies. The non-actionable subsidy
provisions, as defined in Articles 8 and 9 of the SCM Agreement, were certain narrowlydefined specific subsidies for research and development, for adaptation of existing
facilities to new environmental regulations, and for assistance to disadvantaged regions.
These subsidies were selected for non-actionable status on the basis that they furthered
important policy goals and were unlikely to have harmful effects on trade. The provisions
on non-actionable subsidies applied provisionally for a period of five years, and expired
at the end of 1999.
The TCJA includes two measures that potentially violate these rules: The Base Erosion
Anti-Abuse Tax, or BEAT (Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 59A), which can be
seen either as imposing a hidden tariff or as creating an export subsidy, and the Foreign
Derived Intangible Income provision, or FDII (IRC section 250), which can be seen as an
export subsidy.
2. The BEAT
Under new IRC section 59A, US corporate taxpayers must pay an additional “base
erosion anti-abuse tax” (BEAT) to the extent that the “base erosion minimum tax
amount” for the taxable year exceeds their regular tax liability (including the foreign tax
credit and other tax credits, but excluding the R&D tax credit). The “base erosion
minimum tax amount” equals 10%6 of the taxpayer’s modified taxable income. To
determine the modified taxable income, a taxpayer must compute its taxable income for
the year without regard to any payment to a foreign related party with respect to which a
deduction is allowed, including interest (to the extent not otherwise disallowed),
management fees,7 royalties, and, for inverted corporations, also cost of goods sold. Such
payments also include any amount paid or accrued by the taxpayer to a related party for
the acquisition of depreciable property, reinsurance payments to a foreign related party,
and the “base erosion percentage” of an NOL carried forward from a previous year.
There is a safe harbor for smaller corporations with average annual gross receipts for the
last three years below $500 million, and another for corporations with a base erosion
percentage below 3%. The base erosion percentage is determined by dividing the
aggregate amount of base erosion tax benefits of the taxpayer for the taxable year by the
aggregate amount of the deductions allowable to the taxpayer. Finally, new Section 59A
applies to base erosion payments paid or accrued in taxable years beginning after
December 31, 2017.
The BEAT was enacted to address concerns about deductible payments to related parties
being used to erode the US corporate tax base. This concern originally applied primarily
in the context of inversions, because a major reason for inversions was that following the
For the first taxable year beginning after December 31, 2017, the “base erosion minimum tax
amount” equals 5% of the taxpayer’s modified taxable income.
7
A base erosion payment does not include any amount paid or accrued by a taxpayer for
services if such services meet the requirements for eligibility for use of the services cost method
described in Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-9.
6
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inversion (i.e., making the US parent a subsidiary of new foreign parent) it was possible
to load up the US parent with debt, generating deductible interest payments to new
foreign parent in a low-tax jurisdiction. But the BEAT reaches more broadly, as it applies
not only to payments to foreign parents but also to payments to foreign subsidiaries.
The BEAT was enacted in lieu of a much broader House provision that would have
applied a 20% excise tax to all deductible payments to foreign related parties including
cost of goods sold. Such a provision would have been a probable violation of the antitariff rule of GATT II:1(b), because it would be an unscheduled charge on importation of
goods, and of the non-discrimination provision of GATT III:2, because it would only
apply to payments to foreign parties.
The BEAT is much narrower, and most of it applies to interest and royalties, which are
not covered by GATT and by the SCM Agreement. However, there are three aspects of
BEAT that can potentially violate the GATT and SCM rules. Two of them are not likely
to occur frequently in practice, and the remaining aspect has historically been subject to
little WTO enforcement.
The first is the imposition of BEAT on the import of depreciable property. Since this does
not include inventory or parts (which are not depreciable), it would seem unlikely that it
would be imposed frequently enough to warrant a WTO challenge, because the scope of
permitted countervailing measures would be quite limited.
The second and potentially more troubling aspect of BEAT is its imposition on cost of
goods sold in the context of inversions. This can be quite broad and lead to a WTO
violation. However, the provision only applies to post November 2017 inversions that
qualify as such under the definitions of IRC section 7874, and no inversion after section
7874 was enacted in 2004 has qualified as such because the 7874 definition is relatively
easy to avoid (and was left unchanged by TCJA). Thus, it seems unlikely that the BEAT
would actually ever apply to cost of goods sold in practice.
The third aspect is the preferential treatment of R&D credits in the computation of
BEAT. Section 59A(b)(1)(B)(ii) provides that, for purposes of calculating BEAT, the
R&D tax credit claimed by the taxpayer for the taxable year should be added back to the
regular tax liability. This means that the dollar-for-dollar tax benefit provided by the
R&D tax credit is preserved without regard to a taxpayer’s BEAT position. This subtle
amendment has put the R&D credit in a better position compared with most of the
remaining tax credits (e.g. FTC). When the SCM entered into force, the R&D subsidies
were included in the non-actionable subsidies category (Art. 8), meaning that they were
presumed not to distort trade. These provisions were controversial and the non-actionable
category was finally allowed to lapse in 1999. Since then, R&D subsidies have been in
the area of “actionable subsidies”, meaning that they can be challenged, either by dispute
settlement or unilateral countervailing duties. However, to challenge these subsidies, the
complainant country must demonstrate that the subsidy is specific and has injurious
effects on another WTO Member. Despite this change to a more vulnerable legal status,
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R&D subsidies have been the subject of relatively little WTO enforcement. 8 As a standalone measure, it is not expected that the privileged position of the R&D credit would
trigger a WTO challenge. However, from a policy perspective, these incentives are
coordinated with the FDII deduction and the GILTI inclusion (analyzed below), so they
could potentially be linked with export activity, then falling in the category of prohibited
subsidies. Alternatively, following the lessons from the Boeing case, they could be
considered part of a bigger group of tax incentives that in the overall result in a serious
prejudice to the interests of another Member, thus falling in the category of a disallowed
actionable subsidy.
3. The FDII
TCJA and new IRC sections 951A and 250 provide that a 10.5% tax will apply to the
Global Intangible Low Tax Income (“GILTI”) earned by a foreign subsidiary of a US
multinational (“CFC”). GILTI income is the “net tested income” of a foreign subsidiary
that exceeds a 10% rate of return on its tangible assets. Since only a portion (80 percent)
of foreign tax credits are allowed to offset the US taxes applicable to GILTI income, the
minimum foreign tax rate at which no U.S. residual tax is owed by a domestic
corporation is 13.125%. Because this rate is lower than the new US corporate rate of 21%
and because there is no longer a tax imposed on dividends from CFCs to their US
parents, a concern arose that there will be increased incentive to shift income from the US
parents to CFCs in lower tax jurisdictions.
To address the problem of shifting income from the US to CFCs, new IRC section 250
applies a reduced 13.125% rate to “foreign derived intangible income” (FDII) which is
the portion of a US taxpayer “deemed intangible income” (determined on a formulaic
basis) that is derived from serving foreign markets.
Deemed intangible income is the excess of a domestic corporation’s “deduction eligible
income” (gross income without regard to certain enumerated categories) over its “deemed
tangible income return” (10% of its tangible assets).
For the computation of its FDII, a US taxpayer must multiply its deemed intangible
income by the percentage of its deduction eligible income that is foreign-derived. The
“foreign derived deduction eligible income” is defined as income derived in connection
with (1) property that is sold by the taxpayer to any foreign person for a foreign use or (2)
services to any foreign person or with respect to foreign property. In other words, this
category comprises exports for property and services, including royalties from the
licensing of intangibles. The deduction eligible income is essentially the domestic
corporation’s modified gross income. So, a U.S. company’s foreign derived intangible
income, which gets the 13.125% rate, is the amount that bears the same ratio to the
deemed intangible income as the U.S. company’s exports bear to its modified gross
income.
8

Maskus, Keith. Research and Development Subsidies: A Need for WTO Disciplines?
E15Initiative. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and
World Economic Forum, 2015, www.e15initiative.org/.
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While services are excluded from the SCM, the FDII provision clearly applies a lower
rate (13.125% instead of 21%) to a domestic US corporation’s sales of goods to any
foreign person for a foreign use. It is likely that importing goods and then re-exporting
them without significant modification will qualify for the lower rate. 9 Moreover, it is
clear that exporting goods, modifying them, and then importing them to the US qualifies
for the lower rate. 10
FDII clearly involves the non-collection or forgiveness of taxes otherwise due, i.e., a
subsidy under the SCM, and the subsidy is likewise clearly contingent in law and in fact
upon export performance. Thus, there is little doubt that the FDII provision is prohibited
subsidy in violation of the SCM. Such a subsidy entitles trading partners to impose
sanctions, either unilaterally or after receiving approval from the WTO’s Dispute
Resolution Body.
4. How Will the US Respond to Another WTO Loss?
The FDII is just the latest in a long series of US export subsidies that were struck down
by the WTO and its predecessor the GATT. The first adverse decision was a GATT panel
that declared the US “Domestic International Sales Corporation” (DISC) regime to be a
prohibited export subsidy in the 1970s. A DISC was a domestic subsidiary of a US
corporation operating as an export agent of the parent. The main benefit of having a
DISC was that 50% of the DICS’s export income was sheltered from federal income
taxes until distribution. In addition, DISC companies were subject to more favorable
intercompany pricing rules, which deviated from the arm’s length principle, and resulted
in DISC’s export prices being lower than their domestic counterparts.

9

See Michael Schler, Reflections on the Pending Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (Tax Forum no. 686,
Dec. 4, 2017). See also Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. and Batchelder, Lily L. and Fleming, J. Clifton
and Gamage, David and Glogower, Ari D. and Hemel, Daniel Jacob and Kamin, David and Kane,
Mitchell and Kysar, Rebecca M. and Miller, David S. and Shanske, Darien and Shaviro, Daniel
and Viswanathan, Manoj, The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches
Under the New Legislation (December 7, 2017). Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3084187 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3084187 and Avi-Yonah,
Reuven S. and Batchelder, Lily L. and Fleming, J. Clifton and Gamage, David and Glogower, Ari
D. and Hemel, Daniel Jacob and Kamin, David and Kane, Mitchell and Kysar, Rebecca M. and
Miller, David S. and Shanske, Darien and Shaviro, Daniel and Viswanathan, Manoj, The Games
They Will Play: An Update on the Conference Committee Tax Bill (December 18, 2017).
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3089423.
10
See Conference Report, fn. 1522: “If property is sold by a taxpayer to a person who is not a
U.S. person, and after such sale the property is subject to manufacture, assembly, or other
processing (including the incorporation of such property, as a component, into a second product
by means of production, manufacture, or assembly) outside the United States by such person,
then the property is for a foreign use.”
http://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20171218/Joint%20Explanatory%20Statement.pdf.
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The DISC regime was replaced by the “Foreign Sales Corporation” (FSC) regime 11. The
FSC regime essentially exempts a portion of an FSC's export-related foreign-source
income from United States income tax. 12 But the main difference with the DISCs is that
the FSC needs to be incorporated in a qualified offshore location (e.g. Barbados and the
US Virgin Islands), and meet certain other requirements relating to its foreign presence,
to the keeping of records, and to its shareholders and directors. Under these rules, a
portion of the FSC’s export-related foreign source income is legislatively determined not
to be "effectively connected income" and, therefore, is not taxable in the hands of the
FSC. In addition, the US shareholder of the FSC is generally exempted from Subpart F
on its export related foreign source income, and also enjoys a 100% deduction on
distributions from the FSC to the extent they are related to this income. In the late 1990s,
the WTO Panel found the FSC constituted a prohibited subsidy pursuant to article 3.1(a)
of the SCM Agreement. The FSC was deemed export contingent as it was only available
to (i) foreign trading income, (ii) the foreign trading income arising on the sale or lease of
“export property”, and (iii) the export property was limited to goods arising,
manufactured, produced or extracted in the United States.
As a result of this set back, the US Congress repealed the FSC rules and introduced, in
the same Act13, the “Extraterritorial Income” (ETI) regime. The ETI Act was
promulgated by the United States with a view to complying with the recommendations
and rulings of the WTO in the US – FSC dispute. Under the ETI regime (IRC section
114) a taxpayer can exclude a portion of its “extraterritorial income” from its “gross
income” for purposes of calculating his or her Federal income tax liability.
Extraterritorial income generally includes earnings from sales, rental, or services that
involve “qualifying foreign trade property”, which is property: (A) manufactured,
produced, grown or extracted within or outside the United States; (B) held primarily for
sale, lease or rental, in the ordinary course of business, for direct use, consumption, or
disposition outside the United States; and (C) not more than 50 percent of its fair market
value can be attributable to foreign content (including foreign supply and foreign direct
costs of labor). In addition, to qualify as extraterritorial income, the income arising from
the transaction must satisfy the "foreign economic process requirement" This
requirement will be satisfied, generally speaking, where at least some of the activities
comprising the transaction take place outside the United States. The portion of the
extraterritorial income that is excluded from gross income under the ETI regulations was
the greatest of, or the taxpayer's choice of, the following three options: (i) 30 percent of
the foreign sale and leasing income derived by the taxpayer from such transaction; (ii) 1.2
percent of the foreign trading gross receipts derived by the taxpayer from the transaction;
or (iii) 15 percent of the foreign trade income derived by the taxpayer from the
transaction. Finally, where a taxpayer elects to use the ETI measure, it must give up any
tax credits it has obtained through taxation of its income in a foreign jurisdiction that are
attributable to the QFTI excluded from taxation.
The ETI regime was declared to be a prohibited export subsidy in 2004. This led the
GOP-controlled Congress and the Bush administration to repeal the ETI and replace it
11

Tax Reform Act of 1984.
WT/DS108/AB/R.
13
United States Public Law 106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000).
12

7
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2018

7

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 151 [2018]

with a domestic manufacturing provision (IRC section 199) that did not violate the SCM
because it was not contingent on export performance.
This history was well known to the drafters of TCJA. In fact, the FDII provision is a
direct descendant of the “border adjusted tax” (BTA) that was proposed by the House
Republicans in 2016 and that was broadly declared to be a violation of the SCM. 14
Nevertheless, the drafters of TCJA decided to repeal IRC section 199 (which did not
violate the SCM) and replace it with the FDII, which (unlike, for example, the ETI) is a
blatant and obvious violation of the SCM. 15
The FDII has a very low chance of surviving a WTO challenge, even lower than the
previous US export subsidies that were ultimately struck down by the WTO. Not only
because the FDII clearly satisfies the definition of a “prohibited subsidy” under the SCM
Agreement, but also because this new attempt is inconsistent with the main arguments
raised by the US during its longstanding trade dispute with the WTO (“the FSC-US
litigation”).
Putting aside the procedural issues (e.g. panel expertise, appropriate tax forum,
availability of evidence, etc.) and certain definitional divergences, the central arguments
advanced by the US during the US-FSC litigation were the “the rebalancing argument”
and the “double tax argument”.
The rebalancing argument: The US argued that the export-oriented tax breaks enacted by
the US, instead of subsidizing exports, were intended to correct the imbalance suffered by
the US exporters, who are subject to worldwide taxation and do not benefit from a federal
indirect tax system that rebates taxes at the border.
Under the US vision, US export multinationals are at a disadvantage compared with their
European counterparts. This is because many European multinationals enjoy the benefits
of the territorial system of taxation, meaning that they are generally not taxed on profits
earned by their foreign sales subsidiaries (or branches), and/or on subsequent
distributions of such profits. Therefore, the US alleged that the main role of the export
related tax breaks was to establish an economic equivalence with the benefits provided by
the territorial tax system of taxation. Following the US – DISC dispute, the US argued
that the provisions at issue “were intended to provide a limited territorial-type system of
taxation to redress this unbalance” 16. This key US argument will clearly be outdated in a
potential WTO litigation regarding the FDII. The FDII tax break is part of a larger tax
reform package which includes the shift of the US tax system toward territoriality. In the
new US tax system, US corporate shareholders may deduct 100% of the foreign-source
portion of dividends from 10% owned foreign corporations (excluding certain “hybrid”
14

See Avi-Yonah and Clausing, Problems with Destination-Based Corporate Taxes and the Ryan
Blueprint, 8 Columbia J. Tax L. 229 (2017).
15
This issue was raised by Rebecca Kysar well before TCJA was enacted. See Rebecca Kysar,
The Senate Tax Plan Has WTO Problems, Medium.com (Nov. 12, 2017),
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/the-senate-tax-plan-has-a-wto-problem-guest-postby-rebecca-kysar-31deee86eb99.
16
Jennifer E. Farrell, The Interface of International Trade Law and Taxation 140 (2011).
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dividends). In addition, the earnings and profits of a US owned foreign corporation are
not subject to tax, except for certain categories of income (e.g. Subpart F income, GILTI
income). This means that US multinationals are now enjoying same type of territoriality
benefits as their European counterparts, so it seems that there is no longer an unbalance
that needs to be redressed.
Further, the FDII cannot be used to correct the unbalance generated by the
“discriminatory” BTAs, because the FDII technically is a deduction allowed in the
context of the income tax. Annex II of the SCM agreement provides that taxes levied on
inputs consumed in the production of an exported product can be rebated (with certain
limits). But this rebate, intended to avoid double taxation, only applies in the field of
indirect taxation. The FDII is a part of the US income tax, and its liaison with direct
taxation is even more clear than in the case of some predecessors (e.g. BTA, excise tax,
etc). Therefore, unless the US obtains a revision of the WTO rules with respect to the
treatment of border adjustments for internal taxes, the chances of this argument to
succeed are pretty low. In addition, BTAs are intended to prevent double taxation in the
field of indirect taxation, so it is unlikely that the WTO would extend these rules to the
income tax which has its own mechanisms to prevent double taxation.
The double tax argument: As an alternative argument, the US alleged that even if the tax
break given to exporters involved export contingent subsidies, these subsidies would not
be prohibited because the fifth sentence of footnote 59 to the SCM Agreement permits a
Member to take measures granting special fiscal treatment to "foreign-source income" in
order to alleviate a "double taxation" burden on its taxpayer. The fifth sentence of
footnote 59, therefore, constitutes an exception to the legal regime applicable to export
subsidies under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement by explicitly providing that when a
measure is taken to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income, a Member is
entitled to adopt it. The WTO Appellate Body has interpreted that the fifth sentence of
footnote 59 allows Members to "take", or "adopt" measures to avoid double taxation of
foreign-source income, notwithstanding that they may be, in principle, export subsidies
within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM agreement. 17 The term "foreign-source
income" in footnote 59 refers to income which is susceptible of being taxed in two States.
This means income generated by activities of a non-resident taxpayer in a "foreign" State
which have such links with that State so that the income could properly be subject to tax
in that State.18 The determination of whether the activities of the non-resident taxpayer
are linked with the foreign country is based on the general principles of the international
tax system, which are imbedded in the tax treaty network, domestic law, and generally
accepted practices.
The FDII regime provides a reduced 13.125% rate to the foreign portion of a US
taxpayer’s deemed intangible income. Such foreign portion includes: (i) Income from the
sale of property by the taxpayer to a non US person for a foreign use (export of goods);
(ii) Income from services provided with respect to property or a person not located in the
US (export of services).

17
18

WT/DS108/AB/R.
Id.
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Under the general principles of the international tax system, income from exports to a
foreign country are typically not subject to income taxes in such foreign country. The
longstanding rule of exclusive residency based taxation on export sales income is
included in the Permanent Establishment (“PE”) provision of every double tax treaty. The
treaties generally provide that a non-resident exporter with no fixed place of business,
office, or agent in the destination country would not trigger a PE, and therefore, would
not be subject to income taxes in that foreign country. Further, most countries have a
similar provision in their domestic tax law. The US domestic tax regime, for example,
provides that the direct export of products to US customers by a non-resident is not
viewed as a US trade or business and does not trigger income taxes in the US for the nonresident exporter (assuming that the foreign corporation does not have a US office or
agent, marketing, or direct solicitation activities in the US). 19 This general understanding
has been reinforced by the TCJA, which modified the sourcing rules for sales income
provided by Section 863(b). Under new Section 863(b), gains, profits, and income from
the sale or exchange of inventory property produced in the United States are exclusively
sourced to the country where the products are manufactured.
In light of these provisions, the argument that the FDII would prevent double taxation is
expected to be even more fragile than in the case of its immediate predecessors. In this
regard, the ETI regime included a "foreign economic process requirement", which to
some extent supported the view that this regime was intended to prevent double taxation.
But the FDII does not include a foreign requirements, and is granted to any US exporter
notwithstanding its foreign involvement or the structure of its supply chain. Therefore,
we can anticipate that the FDII may not be successfully protected with the “double
taxation argument” in the case of being subject to a WTO dispute.
Given its weakness, it is almost certain that the FDII will draw a challenge in the WTO.
Before the TCJA was finalized and signed into law by President Trump, the finance
ministers of Europe’s five largest economies, communicated to the White House and the
US Department of the Treasury their view regarding the potential violations of WTO
obligations perpetrated by the FDII. This communication was an obvious warning of
European retaliation.
The fragility of the FDII regimes raises the question of whether the current administration
and the Republican majorities in Congress would react to another WTO loss and
sanctions in the same way as the Bush Administration and its GOP Congressional
majorities reacted in 2004, i.e., by repealing the offensive provision. I believe the answer
is probably no. Here is the reply to this question provided by a senior GOP lobbyist:
“Top USTR staff told me in March 2017 that the WTO will likely, one day, take
on the Trump administration. The implication was that the future of the WTO
would be at risk because the economic nationalists are WTO skeptics…
Sovereignty is a big issue for the administration. It is also big among lefty fair
traders. The WTO should not be able to overrule US laws.
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Tax is something the GOP free traders care deeply about. If a country took us on
at the WTO, the GOP opposition to the WTO would grow. If the WTO rules
against us, the remedy is to authorize tariffs by the petitioner against US goods or
services of the petitioner’s choice. The WTO does not directly change domestic
US law after a ruling. The US could simply pay those tariffs as it has in one or
two cases in the past.
Or the US could increase its challenge to the WTO in ways that USTR Bob
Lighthizer would likely be creative about. In addition to what he is doing now…
(1) preventing the re-authorization of the term of a WTO judge on grounds that he
rules on the basis of doctrine not contained in the WTO agreement, or (2)
preventing the WTO negotiation functions from achieving new agreements.
The National Security Strategy released by the administration last Monday
basically said that liberalizing trade with China was a mistake because the
assumption that China would be more democratic and capitalistic ended up
wrong. Lighthizer has said that the WTO is ill-equipped to handle comprehensive
state-capitalism, and ill-equipped to handle the varying economic systems and
development levels of all its members.
This is a long way of saying - I’m not sure. But any WTO challenge could
threaten the existence or efficacy of the WTO because of this context. Or threaten
the US willingness to continue as a member. As between tax cuts and the WTO,
the GOP free traders would likely choose tax cuts.”
5. Conclusion
If the GOP lobbyist is to be believed, a WTO challenge to the FDII could result in a
major clash between the US and the WTO, with potentially disastrous consequences.
Even if he is exaggerating, the willingness of the GOP Congressional majorities to defy
the WTO stands in stark opposition to the way the GOP behaved in 2004. This relatively
obscure tax issue could have very troubling long-term implications.
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